Abstract. We describe a case study where novel program analysis technology has been used to pinpoint a subtle bug in a formally developed control program for an embedded system. The main technology amounts to rst de ning a process algebra (called behaviours) suited to the programming language used (in our case CML) and secondly to devise an annotated type and e ect system for extracting behaviours from programs in a such a manner that an automatic inference algorithm can be developed. The case study is a control program developed for the \Karls-ruhe Production Cell" and our analysis of the behaviours shows that one of the safety conditions fails to hold.
Introduction
There are several approaches for how to close the gap between the speci cation of a system and its actual realisation as a program in some programming language. Di erent procedures for systematic design have been developed with the goal of reducing the likelihood of introducing errors, and concise notations have been introduced for documenting and reasoning about systems. Unfortunately, a system may have been developed using formal methods but still have bugs. Advanced proof techniques may have been used to show that the speci cation ful ls certain safety and liveness properties, but there is always the risk that the formalisation does not fully correspond to the informal description (or even a formal description in another framework) and that the code written does not fully correspond to the speci cation. Clearly the risk of such unfortunate scenarios gets smaller the more care is taken in the development of the system but we believe that it is not feasible to completely eliminate the risk. Indeed there always is the risk of human mistake (like using a previous incorrect version of the system instead of the current correct version) and of malicious behaviour (a subcontractor cutting corners to increase pro t). While formal methods clearly are very useful for increasing our con dence in the system, it would seem that more is needed. In this paper we demonstrate that technology from program analysis can be invaluable in spotting some of the subtle bugs that may have survived the careful use of formal methods. Traditionally, program analysis has been used in optimising compilers but due to their ability to analyse programs automatically and systematically we claim that they also have an important role to play in program validation. Although the kind of properties of interest in program validation may di er from those of interest in optimising compilers, we demonstrate in this paper that recent developments have paved the way for adapting program analysis to the new application domain.
Background. In 7, 8] we present an annotated type system for extracting the communication topology of programs written in a subset of CML 9] . We introduce a formalism of behaviours, a process algebra like CCS or CSP but tailored to the characteristics of CML. The traditional type system for CML is then extended such that it determines behaviours of expressions as well as their types. Both CML and the behaviours are equipped with a small-step operational semantics and a key theoretical result is a subject reduction result ensuring that whenever the CML program engages in a communication, then also the behaviour will be able to do so. This means that safety results obtained by analysing the behaviour also apply to the original CML program.
In 1] we develop an algorithm for type and behaviour reconstruction. The development is su ciently general that (1) the behaviours contain causality information, (2) ML-like polymorphism is supported, and (3) the algorithm is sound as well as complete with respect to the annotated type system. These properties are crucial for the application described in the present paper. The causality of the various operations is often an integral part of safety conditions for systems; without causal behaviours one can only validate rather few properties of interest. Polymorphism is important when analysing generic programs; without polymorphism (or perhaps polyvariance) one will need to merge information from di erent function calls and this may make it impossible to validate many interesting properties. The soundness result ensures that the behaviours obtained by the algorithm are correct with respect to the semantics of the program and the completeness result ensures that the behaviours are as precise as is possible according to the annotated type system; it should be obvious that these are crucial properties as well. Having established the theoretical foundations 1] we have implemented a prototype for extracting behaviours from programs 2]. The present version is able to deal with a fairly large subset of CML and provides the basis for the experiments reported here. thermore, it has been combined with the FZI simulator to a working prototype that has subsequently been tested. None the less, our program analysis reveals that the program does not ful l all of its safety conditions. Our experiments show that the program makes certain assumptions about the initial con guration of the system { a bug that has escaped the formal veri cation. Furthermore, it turns out that the simulator makes similar assumptions about the initial con guration so that this particular bug will never turn up during testing. We should stress that we do not mean to criticise neither the formal development nor the veri cation methods nor the programmers. We merely see it as an illustration of a typical problem in the development of complex software systems as was alluded to above. We believe that the results of our case study presents convincing arguments for also using novel program analysis techniques when validating safety conditions of embedded systems. Although we have been able to validate many of the safety conditions of interest, and to nd one that does not hold, there is room for extending our techniques because some of the safety conditions require information not presently included in the behaviours.
Overview. In Section 2 we give a brief introduction to the basic primitives of CML and we present a fragment of the program used in the case study. Then in Section 3 we introduce the behaviours and sketch some of the central rules for how to obtain behaviours from a CML program. In Section 4 we examine three of the safety conditions of the Production Cell and in Section 5 we discuss some further enhancements of our techniques. Finally, Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.
The case study
The Production Cell is designed to process metal blanks in a press 4]; its various components are shown from above on Figure 1 which is a picture from the FZI simulator. The work pieces (metal blanks) enter the system on the feed belt (the bottom one on Figure 1 ) and are then transfered one at a time to a rotating table; the table is then lifted and rotated such that one of the two robot arms can take the work piece and place it in the press. After processing the work piece, the other robot arm will take it out of the press and deliver it to a deposit belt (the top one on Figure 1 ). For testing purposes a crane has been added to move the work pieces from the deposit belt back to the feed belt. We shall concentrate on just one of these entities, namely the rotating 2: The table must not be rotated clockwise if it is in the position required for transferring work pieces to the robot, and it must not be rotated counterclockwise if it is in the position to receive work pieces from the feed belt. 3: There can only be one work piece at the table at any time.
The program. CML 9] is an extension of the higher-order functional language SML 5] with constructs for communication. Processes and channels can be created dynamically using the constructs spawn and channel; the constructs send and accept are available for synchronous communication. Functions as well as channels are rst class values and so are events: an event is a potential communication created by one of the constructs transmit and receive. There is also an explicit synchronisation operation sync so the construct send(ch,v) is equivalent to sync(transmit(ch,v)) and similarly accept(ch) is equivalent to sync(receive(ch)). Events can be manipulated using the construct wrap; this corresponds to a kind of speculative post-processing of an event in that it will only take e ect if and when the event is synchronised. Finally, we shall mention the construct choose which can be used to choose one of several events. The CML program for the Production Cell consists of 7 processes. They communicate with the simulator using 63 channels and they communicate internally using 16 channels. The part of the program controlling the movements of the table is shown in Figure 2 . It uses the following channels for communicating with the simulator: Internally, the table synchronises its movements with the feed belt and the robot and for this it uses the following channels: We shall not explain the program in detail here; some of the points will naturally be dealt with when we come to discussing aspects of its behaviour.
Behaviours
The safety requirements imposed on the Production Cell are to a large extent concerned with the order in which the communications are performed. This is exactly the kind of information that is available in the behaviours. The behaviours are terms of a process calculus designed to match the structure of CML. The basic behaviours are:
{ is the behaviour of a program that does not create any channels or processes and that is not involved in any communication; { t chan r is the behaviour of a program that creates a channel that can be used to communicate values of type t and where the channel belongs to the region r (a region is an indication of where in the program the channel has been created); { fork b is the behaviour for a program that spawns a new process that will behave as described by the behaviour b; { r!t is the behaviour of a program that sends a value of type t on one of the channels created in the region r; and fun The basic behaviours can then be combined using sequencing (expressed by`;') and choice (expressed by`+') and they can be recursively de ned.
As an example consider the following behaviours: Bc = {table_angle}?int;{table_right}!unit; B1;{table_stop_h}!unit B1 = {new_table_angle}?unit;{table_angle}?int;( + B1)
The behaviour B c expresses that rst there will be a communication on the channel Figure 2 . Comparing the code for the function with the behaviour above shows that we have recorded which communications take place and in which order, but we have ignored all values and tests. So while the behaviour retains the overall control structure of the code, it loses those details of tests that determine which branch is taken in conditionals (as e.g. that the clockwise rotation of the table is stopped at the angle given as argument to the function).
Construction of behaviours. The behaviours are extracted from the CML program by an extension of the standard polymorphic type system. The idea is that each of the concurrency primitives when supplied with the appropriate parameters gives rise to one of the basic behaviours, and the composite expressions will tell how these behaviours are combined into larger behaviours. A function may require some arguments in order to exhibit its behaviour and an event may need to be synchronised in order to exhibit its behaviour, and to capture this we shall annotate the types with behaviour information. So a function may have the type t 1 ! b t 2 meaning that it takes an argument of type t 1 , gives a result of type t 2 and in doing so it will perform communications as described by the behaviour b. Similarly, an event may have the type t event b meaning that when synchronised it will give rise to a value of type t and in doing so it will perform communications as described by b. The following speci es the annotated types of some of the primitive operations: The construction of the behaviours can be formulated as an annotated type system and below we illustrate the basic idea; for the details we refer to 7, 1]. A type environment tenv gives the annotated type of a variable and just mentioning a variable x (in a call-by-value language like CML) does not give rise to any interesting behaviour so we write this as The idea is that we rst determine the annotated type and the behaviour of the operator and the operand. CML has a call-by-value parameter mechanism so operationally we will rst observe the communications originating from the operator, then those from the operand and nally those from the called function. Hence the application will have the behaviour b 1 ; b 2 ; b { note that the causality of the communications are recorded. In order for this approach to work we have to be able to enlarge the behaviours. As an example, all the elements in the argument list to the choose primitive must have the same behaviour and to achieve this we shall need a subsumption rule is some ordering on behaviours that for example will express that + is an upper bound operator so b 1 can be enlarged to b 1 + b 2 . The ordering will also express that is a left and right identity for sequencing ( ; b = b = b; ) and this allows us to get rid of a lot of uninteresting occurrences of . The full type system employs a general subtyping rule and also has rules for dealing with ML-like polymorphism; we shall spare the reader for these details as they do not seem so important for the current discussion. Instead we refer Correctness issues. The language CML as well as the language of behaviours are equipped with a small-step operational semantics. This forms the basis for a correctness proof that essentially says that whenever the CML program performs a sequence of steps then also the associated behaviour can perform similar steps. To be more speci c: when the semantics of the CML program performs a step corresponding to sending a value v of type t on some channel ch in some region r then the semantics of the behaviour can take a step that will execute the basic behaviour r!t, and similarly for the other primitive actions. Thus the behaviours give a safe approximation of the communications performed by the CML program. The behaviour may be able to perform more actions than are possible by the CML program, for example because it will always be able to take both branches of a conditional. However, in the case where the behaviour only can perform one action then the CML will eventually have to perform a matching action { unless it is deadlocked or is looping. To illustrate this, consider a behaviour that contains the sequence ftable is not topg?unit; ftable upwardg?unit and assume the behaviour of the process of interest only has those two occurrences of communications on the channels 
Safety conditions
Most safety conditions of the Production Cell 4] are concerned about the interplay between communications of only a few channels. Much of this information is directly available in the behaviours and we can easily attempt validating the three conditions mentioned in Section 2 based on the behaviours given in Figure 3 . However, it is convenient to be able to ignore those channels that are not relevant for validating the condition at hand, i.e. to abstract away from communications on those channels. As an example, suppose that we want to validate the following safety condition:
The engine starting the vertical movement of the table is always turned o before it is turned on (assuming that it is initially turned o ).
We shall rely on some assumptions about the environment: The engine can only be turned on using one of the two channels table upward and table downward and it can only be turned o using the channel table stop v. We shall therefore replace all communications mentioned in Figure 3 that do not involve any of these three channels with ellipses and then we shall apply some straightforward simpli cations in order to obtain: B0 = ;{table_upward}!unit; ;{table_stop_v}!unit;
;{table_downward}!unit;
;{table_stop_v}!unit;
;B0
This simpli ed behaviour clearly shows that the engine is turned on and o in the manner described by the safety condition. Just as our prototype is responsible for producing the behaviour of Figure 3 it can also be used to produce the above simpli ed behaviours. The theoretical foundations for the simpli ed behaviours are established in 1].
We shall now go through the three safety conditions of the rotating table mentioned in Section 2 and discuss to what extent they can be validated using the behaviours. Based on the informal description of the condition and some overall assumptions about the environment we shall decide which channels are of relevance for the condition and extract that part of the behaviour. It turns out that this will be a fairly simple behaviour so we can immediately judge whether or not the safety condition is ful lled; clearly a more formal approach is possible as well.
The table must not be moved downward if it is in its lower position, and it must not be moved upward if it is in its upper position.
Validation of this condition relies on some assumptions about the environment:
The vertical movement of the We therefore select these six channels and obtain the following simpli ed behaviour from Figure ;{table_downward}!unit;{table_is_bottom}?unit;
Thus we see that all communications on The table must not be rotated clockwise if it is in the position required for transferring work pieces to the robot, and it must not be rotated counterclockwise if it is in the position to receive work pieces from the feed belt.
Again we have to rely on some assumptions about the environment. From this it is easy to see that we have validated the following version of the safety condition:
The table is alternating between being rotated clockwise and counterclockwise.
However there is no information in the behaviours ensuring that the clockwise rotation stops when the angle is 50 (as required for the robot) or that the counterclockwise rotation stops when the angle is 0 (as required for the feed belt). More powerful analysis techniques will be needed to capture this kind of information; we shall return to this in Section 5. There can only be one work piece at the table at any time.
This condition is concerned about the synchronisation between the individual processes of the system and hence its validation will depend on properties of the other processes, in particular those for the feed belt and the robot. The table is the passive part in both of these synchronisations. The channels belt1 transmit ready and belt1 transmit done are used to synchronise with the feed belt; between these two communications it is the responsibility of the feed belt to place a work piece on the table. The channels table transmit ready  and table transmit done are used to synchronise with the robot; between these two communications it is the responsibility of the robot to remove a work piece from the table.
The analysis of the table will therefore need to make some assumptions about the feed belt and the robot. These assumptions will later have to be validated by analysing the behaviour of the program fragments for the respective processes. The assumptions are:
(a) Whenever the feed belt leaves the critical region speci ed by the two channels belt1 transmit ready and belt1 transmit done it will have moved one (and only one) work piece to the Clearly this shows that the two pairs of communications alternate. Also it shows that the synchronisation with the feed belt happens rst and by assumption (a) a work piece is placed on the table. The simpli ed behaviour shows that subsequently there will be a synchronisation with the robot and by assumption (b) the work piece will be removed from the table. Hence Condition 3 has been validated with respect to the assumptions. As expected we cannot validate Condition 2 from this. But even worse, we cannot even validate that the table is alternating between being rotated clockwise and counterclockwise; only that it is rotated an even number of times. The reason for the latter is that the current version of our technology does not incorporate any information about values of variables and the entities communicated and therefore we cannot prune the behaviour for turn to to take the branch of interest for a given value of the parameter. We expect that techniques from Control Flow Analysis 3, 6] will prove useful when further developing the technology. The CML program for the Production Cell is basically a rst-order program and hence it does not exploit the higher-order constructs of CML. Our technique has no problems handing higher-order functions nor communication of channels. To illustrate a simple version of this, consider the following generic function The behaviour of this version of the program is exactly as in Table 3 ; in particular the techniques easily distinguish between the di erent sets of parameters supplied to the four calls of the move function.
Conclusion
We have argued that even the careful use of formal program development techniques may in practice produce bugs that go undetected. To increase the available techniques for validating embedded systems we have argued that the use of novel program analysis technology is likely to be indispensable and we have substantiated this claim by the development of a prototype.
